The legacy of wars around the world: evidence from military directors by An, Jiafu et al.
1 
 
The Legacy of Wars around the World: 
Evidence from Military Directors  
Jiafu Ana,c, Tinghua Duanb, Wenxuan Houa and Xianda Liua   
a The University of Edinburgh Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JS, UK 
b  IÉSEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), 1 parvis de La Défense, 92044 Paris, La Défense 
Cedex, France  




This study estimates the effects of wars on countries and firms. We first show immediate negative 
effects of wars on economic and financial development as well as legal institutions. Using a cross-
country sample of 93,697 firm-year observations, we further argue and show that (i) wars increase 
the supply of military directors in corporate boards; and (ii) military directors reduce firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). We interpret these lingering 
effects as military directors possessing social capital but lacking business expertise. Our results are 
robust to a matched sample, a lagged difference model, a dynamic general method of moments 
model and to the control of country, industry and year fixed effects.    
 
 


















War brings destruction to society and is often described as “development in reverse” (Collier et al. 
2003). A large cross-country literature shows that war-torn regions suffer from a substantial decline 
in total output, experience slower economic development, and have less persistent growth rates 
compared to similar but peaceful regions (Barro 1991, Alesina et al. 1996, Alesina and Perotti 1996). 
While this literature has been enormously influential, it has not yet been able to isolate a clear 
channel through which war influences economic performance. This paper links war to firm 
economic performance through directors with military experience. In doing so, we attempt to take 
a step further in understanding the relationship between, and the mechanism linking, war and its 
economic consequences. 
Understanding how war influences economic development is crucial, because nearly half 
of all countries in the world have suffered from either external or internal armed conflict in the 
past few decades (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, Blattman and Miguel 2010). 
People living in war-affected places may be killed, traumatized, or separated from their families. 
They may also be displaced, prevented from attaining education, and excluded from skilled work. 
A vibrant stream of research documents the negative effects of war on later-life income, health, 
and education. Yet, these negative outcomes may have implications on the wider society. In this 
paper, we aim to provide evidence of such implications.  
To do so, we merge several datasets on war, board directors, and firm performance during 
1999-2016, from 119 countries, and examine whether directors with military experience influence 
firm performance. Particularly, the war dataset, Correlates of War Data (COW), contains 
information on the involved parties, durations, and casualties of wars during 1816-2007. We merge 
these data with information on board directors from BoardEx, a database that contains 
information on directors’ backgrounds, genders, and tenures, as well as board sizes, and shares of 
independent directors. Finally, we combine this dataset with firm performance measures, such as 
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Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA), market capitalization, leverage, fixed assets (property, plant 
and equipment, henceforth PPE), and sales, from Thomson Reuters’ WorldScope. We then assess 
the association between military directors and firm outcomes by regressing measures of firm on 
the share of military directors on the board, while accounting for observable covariates and some 
country-level unobservable factors.  
Theories on war and its legacy on individuals’ behaviours suggest that military directors 
from war-affected regions can influence firm performance in both directions. On the one hand, 
directors with military experience can incorporate strict disciplines in monitoring firms’ managers, 
when necessary, and thus improve the corporate governance quality (Benmelech and Frydman 
2015). The reduction in agency costs due to improved governance can subsequently translate into 
good firm performance. Further, directors with military experience can improve the efficiency of 
the board in general because war, or conflict in general, can foster cooperative and prosocial 
behaviours among the affected individuals (Bauer et al. 2016). The increased board efficiency can 
improve firm performance through monitoring and/or advising mechanisms.  
On the other hand, military directors may affect firm performance negatively because of 
the interruption to human capital and work experience accumulation when in the army (Angrist 
1990, 1998, Angrist and Krueger 1994). Lack of education and experience may result in poor 
governance and advice from military directors, causing firm performance to decline. In addition, 
the effects of psychological trauma, such as malaise or less engagement with other people, may 
cause problems in board communication and coordination, thus lowering the efficiency of the 
board (Ehlers and Clark 2000, Galovski and Lyons 2004) and, in turn, firm performance.  
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, as motivating analyses, we 
show that war-torn countries are correlated with slower growth in gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, a smaller amount of private credit, and a poorer legal environment as proxied by the 
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rule of law index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database1. More importantly, 
we show that countries that have experienced wars are associated with more military directors and 
more firms with military directors, and this relationship holds both at the extensive margin 
(proxied by the number of wars in a country) and the intensive margin of war (measured by the 
number of casualties of and the number of years at war).  
Next, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, we discover that the share of military 
directors is strongly, negatively correlated with a firm’s performance as proxied by Tobin’s Q. In 
order to isolate the effects of military directors on firm performance, we saturate the model by 
including a large set of covariates, including market capitalization, leverage, PPE, sales growth, 
board size, board independence, the gender ratio of the board, the average tenure of the board 
members, and CEO duality, as well as country, industry and year fixed effects to control for 
unobservable time-invariant country and industry traits, and global events in any specific year. The 
estimated effects of military directors on firm performance, assuming causality, is non-trivial. 
Consider column (1) in Table 6, where a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of military 
directors (0.05) is associated with a 0.02 (=0.05*0.4119) decrease in a firm’s Tobin’s Q, equivalent 
to 1% of the sample average. The estimated effect on the extensive margin of military directors is 
also striking. Using a dichotomous variable that equals one if a firm has at least one military director 
and zero otherwise as our key independent variable, we uncover that the relationship between 
military directors and firm performance, measured either by Tobin’s Q or ROA, is both significant 
and negative. The economic size of the estimates is large. For example, an average firm with at 
least one military director on the board has a Tobin’s Q that is 0.06 points lower than an identical 
firm without a military director. To provide a reference, this is 3% of the sample mean. When 
using ROA as a proxy for firm performance, we find qualitatively similar results.  
 
1 We justify the use of these variables in the data section. 
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These empirical patterns suggest that the negative impacts of military directors (mainly via 
the advising mechanism) on firm performance outweigh the positive (largely through the 
monitoring channel) in our sample. We proposal several explanations. First, board members may 
generally exert more efforts in advising than in monitoring. Indeed, as stressed in Güner, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), board directors spend a significantly greater portion of their time 
advising than they do monitoring the managers (Adams and Ferreira 2007). Therefore, even if 
military experience changed directors’ monitoring and advising behaviours to the same extent, we 
would still observe the advising (negative) channel of military directors as dominating the 
monitoring (positive) mechanism, resulting in a net negative impact on firm performance. Second, 
the improved monitoring of firm managers due to a high level of integrity applied by military 
directors may again stymie effective advising, since managers (facing heightened oversight) may be 
unwilling to disclose inside information to directors. Without effective and useful information 
from the management, directors may provide uninformed advice and make inferior business 
decisions, hence destroying firm value (Adams and Ferreira 2007, Harris and Raviv 2006, Duchin, 
Matsusaka and Ozbas 2010). This puts a dynamic factor on the negative impact military directors 
have on firm performance, such that we observe a net negative effect in our empirical analyses. 
Lastly, since the previous two explanations are not mutually exclusive, the net negative impact may 
be a result of both mechanisms at play: managers spend less time monitoring managers, and if they 
do, they stymie the information flow from managers and consequently give uninformed advice 
and make inferior business decisions. While our data do not allow us to differentiate among these 
explanations, they nonetheless provide some suggestive evidence on the possible channels that 
may be underlying the empirical patterns. 
There may be unobservable omitted variables correlated with both firm performance and 
the number of military directors that could potentially be driving our results. For example, 
economically successful countries with many successful firms may also be able to wage more wars 
and therefore have more military directors. Similarly, directors with military experience may 
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automatically sort themselves into industries that have high profit margins, such as arms and 
ammunitions. To mitigate this concern, we add an array of fixed effects at both the national and 
industry levels. In addition, we control for time-specific shocks to further saturate the model. Note 
that the empirical patterns documented here should still be interpreted with caution because we 
are unable to account for time-variant, unobservable factors.  
Another important concern arises from potential reverse causality. That is, firms with 
poorer performance may be more likely to appoint military directors in order to improve 
performance. Indeed, several studies document that directors with military experience serve as 
better monitors of firms’ managers and therefore increase firm performance (e.g., Benmelech and 
Frydman 2015). We conduct two tests to address this concern. First, we redo our baseline analyses 
with a lagged first difference (LFD) model, where we regress the change in the measures of firm 
performance in year t on the change in the military director variables in year t-1. We find that our 
results for Tobin’s Q become stronger both quantitatively and qualitatively. The results for ROA, 
however, become imprecisely estimated. One possible reason is that, due to a lack of business 
experience, military directors may put more emphasis on firms’ short-run profits at the expense of 
their long-term growth potential. Therefore, we observe little difference in ROA between firms 
with more versus fewer military directors, but a large difference in Tobin’s Q, a measure of a firm’s 
future growth. Another possible explanation is the reduced sample size. Using the LDF model, 
our sample size decreases by about 40%, which results in a larger standard error. Note that it is 
difficult to disentangle which explanation drives our results, or whether it is both. Thus, we seek 
further evidence from a two-step dynamic general method of moments (GMM) model. 
We re-run our analyses using a two-step dynamic GMM model, which potentially allows 
us to circumvent both omitted variables and reverse causality issues (Blundell and Bond 1998, 
Judson and Owen 1999). In particular, we treat all dependent variables as endogenous and 
instrument them using their lagged values in years t-3 and t-4, under the assumption that these 
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lagged values influence the outcomes variables in year t only though their values in t-1 (Bun and 
Windmeijer 2010). The estimates from the GMM model confirm our main results. We find that 
military directors significantly reduce firm performance as proxied by either Tobin’s Q or ROA. 
This is in line with the second explanation that the imprecise estimates for firm ROA from the 
LFD model are due to a huge reduction in sample size. We, nevertheless, advise readers to take 
caution when interpreting our results.  
It is also possible that the covariates that we are currently controlling for may have non-
linear relationships with the measures of firm performance and the variables related to military 
directors, such as the directors’ genders and tenures and the board size. We therefore perform a 
propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to tackle this issue. Specifically, we first match firms on 
market capitalization, leverage, PPE, sales growth, board size, board independence ratio, directors’ 
gender, directors’ tenure and CEO duality, and then we conduct simple mean tests on the treated 
and control groups. We discover that the results are qualitatively identical to the OLS estimates, 
providing reassurance about our analyses.  
This study relates to the literature on the economic legacies of wars. Cerra and Saxena 
(2008) find that GDP growth rates decline by 6% immediately after a civil war. Quantitative case 
studies, such as Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Justino and Verwimp (2006), show that 
economic growth decreases significantly following armed conflicts, a pattern consistent with the 
cross-country evidence. Our paper complements these macro studies from a micro-economic 
perspective. We show that war hinders economic performance through the influence of military 
directors in war-affected areas. This suggests that the influence of wars on the economy goes 
beyond the direct effects on physical and human capital.  
This paper adds to a large literature on the link between board directors’ experience and 
various firm policies and outcomes. Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) document that board 
directors with experience in commercial banks increase firms’ access to external financing, and 
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directors with investment bank experience help firms raise larger amounts of credit through debt 
issuance. Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) show that directors with business experience in a foreign 
country can increase a firm’s governance quality and thus promote firm growth. Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2012) demonstrate that firms with foreign independent directors have better cross-border 
acquisitions outcomes when the targets are based in their home countries. We contribute to this 
line of research by presenting evidence that directors with military experience stymie firm growth 
due to their lack of business experience. In a related strand of literature, Benmelech and Frydman 
(2015) document that firms led by chief executives with military experience tend to perform better 
during economic downturns (An et al. 2019a). We complement this study by showing the negative 
impacts imposed by directors with military experience. While Benmelech and Frydman’s (2015) 
study emphasizes the positive traits of veterans, including being ethnic and conservative, we stress 
their other, important side, i.e., their lack of business experience. 
This study also contributes to the literature on the negative impacts of war on human 
capital. Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) document that, in Zimbabwe, young children 
who experience war-related malnutrition become stunted as adults, with likely adverse effects on 
their lifetime labour productivity. Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh (2009) show that children 
from a war-torn region have considerably lower height-for-age ratios than otherwise identical 
children. In a related study, Shemyakina (2006) discovers that adolescent Tajik girls who have seen 
their homes destroyed in the civil war have a lower probability to get secondary education, which 
may have a negative influence on their future wages and life chances. Our study sheds light on this 
literature by documenting that, for those who have found their way into skilled employment, war 
experiences can still have an adverse impact on their performance.  
Lastly, our study relates to the literature on post-war economic recovery. Studies that 
examine the consequences of U.S. bombing on post-war performance find that places heavily 
affected by the bombing quickly recovered to the pre-war trends, in terms of population, in both 
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Japan and Germany (Davis and Weinstein 2002, Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm 2004). In 
Vietnam, Miguel and Roland (2006) find a similarly rapid recovery of the local population after 
bombing. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical model, 
namely, rapid recovery to pre-war equilibrium levels. Our paper provides the contrary evidence 
that war can have lasting impacts through human capital. Even wars that happened nearly 200 
years ago can still exert an adverse influence on military directors from the war-affected regions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature, 
section 3 introduces the data and methodology, and section 4 presents the country-level outcomes. 
Section 5 discusses the effects of military directors on firm-level performance, section 6 conducts 
robustness checks, and section 7 presents results on firm leverage. Section 8 discusses some 
potential future research areas and concludes.  
2. Consequences of warfare 
Since 1960, warfare has afflicted over half of all nations, imposing severe destruction on physical, 
human and social capital, and persistent adverse effects on growth (e.g., Blattman and Miguel 2010, 
Bauer et al. 2016). While war is key to many countries’ development, it has been on the periphery 
of finance and economic research for a very long time. The past two decades have witnessed an 
overdue explosion of research on war’s consequences. This section summarizes this literature, 
identifies the gaps, and provides the motivation for the current study.   
2.1 Physical destruction 
The most staggering impressions of war are those of physical destructions. Cerra and Saxena (2008) 
find that such destruction can cost as much as 6% of a country’s total output. However, a growing 
empirical literature shows that the destroyed physical capital can quickly be recovered after a war 
ends (Przeworski et al. 2000). This is largely consistent with the prediction from the neoclassical 
model, which stresses that a one-time shock has zero impact on the equilibrium level of growth 
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(Lucas 1988, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). Davis and Weinstein (2002) examine the bombing 
of Japan during the second World War and find that areas that were heavily bombed are 
indistinguishable in terms of physical capital (measured by population size) from places that were 
untouched during the bombing, only 20 to 25 years after the war. Brakman, Garretsen and 
Schramn (2004) and Miguel and Roland (2006) find similar results in Germany and Vietnam after 
bombing.  
Nevertheless, there are reasons to apply caution in generalizing these results. First, there 
may be selection bias in the cases of bombing, with places that have recovered having good data 
and those that have not dropping out of sample. Second, bombing itself may not be random and 
is in essence different from other forms of physical destruction, such that the authors may be 
capturing the effects of other unobservable characteristics of bombing. Indeed, after taking all 
forms of civil war into account, Cerra and Saxena (2008) show that, although economic 
performance rebounds most quickly in the case of wars, as compared to other forms of crises (e.g., 
banking and currency crises), only half of the fall is recovered. This leaves room for further 
research into the persistent adverse effects of wars.  
2.2 Human capital 
Another destructive legacy of war is the erosion of human capital. In 1999 alone, nearly 269,000 
deaths and 8.44 million disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) were attributed to wars. Counting 
the cumulative effects of wars between 1991 and 1997, these estimates are tripled (Ghobarah, 
Huth and Russett 2003). While the literature seems to have reached a consensus on the severity of 
war’s impact on human capital, there is still an open debate on how long these adverse effects last. 
On the one hand, Miguel and Roland (2006) find that, 25 years after the Vietnam War, local living 
standards and human capital tend to converge quickly across regions. On the other hand, evidence 
from sub-Saharan Africa shows that such negative effects persist many decades after war. For 
example, Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) show that war-related malnutrition in 
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Zimbabwe leads young children to be significantly shorter as adults, harming their productivity. In 
central Asia, Shemyakina (2006) finds that Tajik girls who did not receive secondary education due 
to the civil war have subsequently earned significantly lower waes. A related literature on the impact 
of conscription on young people reveals similar adverse effects (e.g., Angrist 1990, 1998, Angrist 
and Krueger 1994). 
It is important to note that this literature is limited in its ability to credibly estimate the 
aggregate nation-wide economic consequences of war destructions (Blattman and Miguel 2010). 
Because even largely peaceful regions close to the combat field are adversely affected by war 
disruption, the estimates presented in these studies are likely to underestimate the true effect.          
2.3 Social capital and institutions   
The impact of war on society and institutions are arguably the most important and widely debated 
of all war consequences. A sizable literature argues that wars can promote governments’ legitimacy. 
For instance, in the three cases of bombings discussed previously, the governments rallied their 
citizens to fight foreign enemies and thereby strengthened state institutions (Miguel and Roland 
2006, Davis and Weinstein 2002, Brakman, Garretsen and Schramn 2004). Cross-country studies 
find similar evidence that countries have more stable peace and stronger state institutions after an 
outright military victory for one fighting side (Fortna 2004, Toft, 2003). As Blattman and Miguel 
(2010) point out, this result may not be generalizable to civil wars. In a civil war, both the winning 
and losing sides often co-exist in a society, potentially deepening divisions politically and socially. 
Further, civil wars sometimes create a culture of violence in the society. Miguel, Saiegh and 
Satyanath (2008) show that European football league players with more exposure to civil wars 
commit substantially more fouls than otherwise similar players with less exposure.   
In addition, a vibrant body of literature documents that exposure to wars promotes 
prosocial behaviour, whereby people behave more cooperatively and altruistically. Evidence across 
the globe shows that individuals with more exposure to war-related conflict are more likely to join 
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local social and civic groups, take on leadership roles in their communities, and engage in altruistic 
giving (Bellows and Miguel 2006, Blattman 2009, Bowles 2008). This effect differs little across 
different types of violence, populations, ages and studies with different empirical strategies 
(Bellows and Miguel 2006, Blattman 2009, Voors et al. 2012). In addition, the impact of war on 
prosocial behaviour appears to be very persistent through time. Bauer et al. (2016) show evidence 
that the effect of violence on cooperative behaviour can last for many years after war, and 
sometimes even becomes more pronounced over time. Finally, several studies show that war 
exposure affects in-group prosocial behaviour the most, i.e. among members of one’s own village 
or ethnic group (Bateson 2012, Bauer et al. 2014). However, as these studies rarely define out-
groups consistently, the evidence remains speculative.   
2.4 Theories and hypotheses  
While there are many macro-level studies on the economic consequences of war, micro-analyses 
on how war influences development and through what channels are rare. The existing ones are 
predominantly based on household survey data and may therefore suffer from self-reporting bias 
(Deininger 2003a, Bellows and Miguel 2006). In this paper, we draw our predictions based on 
agency theory and focus on a specific channel, i.e. military directors, through which war affects 
development. 
Agency theory is a particularly useful framework in which to study the link between board 
characteristics and firm outcomes, since it addresses causes and consequences of misaligned 
interests between shareholders and managers (Boyd 1994). The board of directors, representing 
the interests of the shareholders, monitors and advises the firm management so that it will act in 
those interests (Fama and Jensen 1983). Without such monitoring and advising, a CEO with 
minimal equity ownership may focus on pursuing her/his own wealth rather than the good of the 
firm, such as through engineering a higher-than-optimal fixed salary (Walsh and Seward 1990), 
making value-destroying takeovers, i.e. empire building (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986, 
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1993), or designing entrenchment strategies so as to stay in power (Berger, Ofek and Yermack 
1997). Boards of directors can alleviate such agency problems through the “decision control” 
functions. In particular, as emphasized in Fama and Jensen (1983), the board of directors provides 
advice on major business strategies to be initiated by the firm management, and then monitor the 
implementation process and perform evaluations of firm performance. In doing so, the board can 
better resolve and align different interests between shareholders and the top management team 
(Mizruchi 1983, Walsh and Seward 1990), thus increasing firm value.  
However, the extent to which the board of directors can alleviate agency problems depends 
critically on the directors’ willingness and incentives to monitor, and their ability to provide value-
creating advice (Franke 2001, Benmelech and Frydman 2015, Agrawal and Chadha 2005, Defond, 
Hann and Hu 2005). We argue that directors with military experience can affect firm growth in 
two opposing ways, generating an empirical question worth exploring. On the one hand, military 
directors can enhance firm value, since their experience in the army allows them to apply a high 
level of integrity in monitoring firms’ executives (Franke 2001, Benmelech and Frydman 2015). 
On the other hand, directors with military experience can inhibit firm growth because the 
interruption of human capital accumulation when in the army (Griliches and Mason 1972, Angrist 
1990, 1998, Angrist and Krueger 1994) and their lack of business experience and networks can 
make them inefficient in the advising role (An et al. 2019b). In sum, board directors with military 
experience may be a double-edged sword for firm growth, playing an advantageous monitoring 
role but a disadvantageous advising role vis-à-vis their peers. In the following, we first discuss the 
role of directors in shaping firm performance, and then develop our hypotheses on how military 
experience may influence that relationship.   
2.4.1 Board directors and firm performance 
Agency theory argues that firm executives often pursue business strategies that benefit themselves 
at the expense of the shareholders’ interests due to misaligned preferences between managers and 
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shareholders (Holmstrom 1979, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The misaligned preferences, or “moral 
hazard” as labelled by economists, can take many forms, such as insufficient effort (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003), extravagant investments (Jensen 1988[this year not in reference list]), 
entrenchment strategies (Shleifer and Vishny 1989[this year not in ref list]), and self-dealing 
(Burrough and Helyar 1990, Yermack 2004), all of which are found to decrease firm value (e.g., 
Tirole 2006).  
The board of directors is meant to mitigate these moral hazard concerns. In principle, the board 
of directors monitors executives on behalf of the shareholders and is in charge of approving major 
business strategies, setting management’s compensation, and offering advice and connections to 
executives (Fama and Jensen 1983, Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). In practice, however, the 
evidence on the effectiveness of board directors in monitoring and advising management is often 
mixed. One stream of literature argues that corporate boards are merely window dressing and add 
no value to shareholder wealth (e.g., Helland and Sykuta 2004, Bebchuk and Fried 2005). For 
example, board members are often captured by the firm management or are pursuing strategies 
that maximize their personal interests (e.g., perks, social ties, future career benefits) at the expense 
of the shareholders (Jensen 1993, Shivdasani and Yermack 1999, Bebchuk and Fried 2005).  
Other scholars, on the other hand, emphasize and provide evidence on the positive impact of 
boards of directors on firm value (e.g., Dahya and McConnell 2007, Lin, Schmid and Xuan 2018, 
Lin, Officer and Zou 2011). Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), for example, show that an 
improvement in board independence following the 2002 governance reform in the U.S. had a 
positive effect on firm value. Similarly, Lin et al. (2019) find that better-aligned interests between 
directors and shareholders due to a change in directors’ and officers’ insurance policies lead to an 
increase in firm value. Relatedly, several studies document that an increase in directors’ financial 
expertise and accounting knowledge is associated with higher firm value. In sum, the board of 
directors is a key factor determining firm performance, and its effectiveness in shaping firm 
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performance critically depends on board members’ integrity in monitoring, and experience and 
knowledge in advising the management team. 
2.4.2 The role of military experience  
The board of directors can influence firm performance through its monitoring and advising of the 
management. In this section, we argue that directors’ military experience, which instils a high level 
of integrity and in the meantime crowds out business experience and knowledge, affects firm 
performance in two opposing ways.   
On the one hand, military directors can enhance firm value, since their experience in the army 
allows them to apply a high level of integrity to monitoring the firm’s executives and thus improve 
the quality of corporate governance (Franke 2001, Benmelech and Frydman 2015). The reduction 
in agency costs due to improved governance can in turn promote firm growth. Indeed, increasing 
the level of board members’ integrity and independence (hence enabling them to stand up to the 
firm managers) has been a top priority of many corporate governance reforms, such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), and regulations required by various security exchanges. 
Scholarly research also lends support to this argument. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2007), 
Harris and Raviv (2006) and Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) suggest that, when information 
costs are low, a higher level of monitoring due to an exogenous increase in board integrity and 
independence results in greater firm valuation and better outcomes. Since military experience 
instils a high level of integrity in board directors, we expect a positive association between military 
directors and firm outcome. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 




On the other hand, directors with military experience can inhibit firm growth because the 
interruption of human capital accumulation when in the army (Griliches and Mason 1972, Angrist 
1990, 1998, Angrist and Krueger 1994) and the lack of business experience and knowledge can 
lead to uninformed business advice (An et al. 2019a). As stressed in Fama and Jensen (1983), 
boards of directors add value to firms by advising and monitoring the managers. In particular, 
board directors are in charge of major business decisions such as the disposal of assets, investments, 
acquisitions, tender offers by acquirers, executive compensation and risk management (Tirole 
2006). A lack of business experience and knowledge, therefore, can lead to uninformed business 
decisions, hence destroying firm value. Ahern and Dittmar (2012), for example, document that 
younger and less experienced boards that have resulted from a regulatory change in Norway have 
caused a substantial drop in firm stock prices. They further show that the negative impact on firm 
value can last many years, due to inferior business strategies including undertaking unjustified 
acquisitions and increasing firm leverage. Conversely, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Defond, 
Hann and Hu (2005) find positive links between board directors’ financial literacy and the firm’s 
share price. Similarly, Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) document an increase in firm performance 
following the hiring of board members with management and business skills. Since being in the 
army causes an interruption to human capital and business experience and knowledge 
accumulation, we expect a negative association between military directors and firm outcomes, 
leading to the following competing hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis (H1b) Board directors with military experience have a negative impact on firm value.  
 
This paper is distinct in three important ways from previous research. First, we deviate from the 
macro-level analyses and instead focus on one specific channel that links war to development, i.e. 
board directors. While the existing small amount of micro-level evidence largely relies on 
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household survey data, Collier and Duponchel (2012) argue that the key mechanism through which 
war affects development is probably through firms. Second, previous micro-level analyses are 
limited to a single country (Deininger 2003b, Bellows and Miguel 2006, Collier and Duponchel 
2012), and may therefore lack generalizability to other countries. This paper uses a global sample 
of 93,697 firm-year observations to provide a more generalizable estimate. Lastly, we contribute 
to the understanding of war’s impact on firms by providing evidence on a new channel that links 
war to firm growth. Collier and Duponchel (2012) demonstrate that firms’ income and size are 
affected by the disruption to production and reduction in consumer income. We show that war 
also influences firm development through the board of directors. 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section, we firstly define the key data that we use to evaluate the relationships between war 
and various country-level outcomes as well as firm performance. Appendix 1 gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources, and Table 1 provides summary statistics.  
3.1 Data and sample 
We obtain data on wars from COW, which provides information on wars from 1816-2007 around 
the world. We use the data on intra- and inter-state wars that ended before 1945, although the 
dataset also contains information on extra- and non-state wars2. This results in a sample that 
includes 80 countries. Figure 1 shows a visualization of the number of wars by country in our 
sample. 
Our data on country-level economic, financial, and legal development are obtained from 
the World Bank Open Data program. In particular, we measure a country’s financial development 
by the total amount of credit channeled into the private sector, scaled by GDP (Private Credit to 
 
2 Extra-state wars take place between a state(s) and a non-state entity outside the borders of the state, while 
non-state wars are between or among non-state entities. The effects of these wars are difficult to assign to 
specific countries since the involved parties typically do not possess a state status.   
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GDP), an indicator commonly found in the literature (e.g., Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 2007, 
Djankov et al. 2008). The quality of legal institutions is proxied by the rule of law index (Rule of 
Law) from the ICRG database. Several influential studies use the same measure (e.g., Knack and 
Keefer 1997, Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010). After merging the war dataset with these country-
level variables, the number of countries in our sample ranges from 61 to 71.    
At the country level, we construct two variables that measure the prevalence of military 
directors in corporate boards. The first variable measures the total number of directors with 
military experience (MilDirNum), while the second measures the total number of firms that have 
at least one military director sitting on their board (MiliFirm). We also provide a visualization of 
the total number of firms with at least one military director by country in Figure 2. If we 
conceptually overlay Figures 1 and 2, we can see that places with a high intensity of wars also have 
a larger number of firms with military directors.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
At the firm level, we obtain employment information on board directors from the BoardEx 
Individual Profile of Employment database. The database contains various pieces of employment 
information for a global sample of corporate executives. We first identify 15,582 records of military 
employment for 9,455 unique executives, and then match these executives into corporate boards. 
In total, we successfully match 2,642 directors with military experience into 17,519 firms globally. 
Since there might be heterogeneous effects of military directors on firm policy and performance 
due to the different roles they played in the armed forces, we further differentiate between military 
directors with frontline experience and others. BoardEx provides us with the role title held by the 
director when in the military, which enables this.  
In Appendix 2, we present the distribution of observations by country. To increase the 
power of our main tests, we include all sample countries that have at least one matched firm. To 
ensure that our results are not driven by countries with fewer observations, we redo all of our 
19 
 
analyses using only those countries with at least 30 matched firms. Our results are similar both 
quantitatively and qualitatively3.  
We also obtain data on other board characteristics, namely Board Size, Board Independence, 
Gender, Average Time on Board, CEO Duality, Foreign Background, Financial Expertise, and Legal Expertise, 
from BoardEx. We complement this with firm-level data obtained from WorldScope, a dataset 
constructed by Thomson Reuters, namely Tobin’s Q, ROA, Market Capitalization, Leverage, PPE, and 
Sales Growth. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2 Research design 
We use cross-country comparisons of the intensity of war and modern economic, financial and 
legal development, as well as the prevalence of military directors, to provide motivation for our 
examination of the impact of wars on firm performance. We begin with the following regression 
specification: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑊𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛤𝑋′𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛶𝑡 + 𝑐,𝑡                      (1) 
where the dependent variable 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑐,𝑡 is either GDP Per Capita Growth, Private Credit to GDP, Rule 
of Law, MilDirNum, or MiliFirm in country c in year t. Private Credit to GDP is the total amount of 
credit channeled into the private sector scaled by GDP and has been widely used in the literature 
(Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 2007, Djankov et al. 2008). Rule of Law measures the quality of a 
country’s legal system and is obtained from the ICRG database (Knack and Keefer 1997, 
Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010). MilDirNum measures the total number of directors with military 
experience. MiliFirm measures the total number of firms that have at least one military director 
sitting on their board. Our key variable of interest is the 𝑊𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑐,𝑡, which is either War 
 
3 Due to space constraints, we do not present these results here, but submit them to the referees. Results from this 
alternative sample are available upon request. 
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Involve (Dummy), an indicator that equals one if country c experienced war in year t and zero 
otherwise, or War Involve (Number), the total number of wars country c has been through in year t. 
𝑋′𝑐,𝑡 is a vector of country-level control variables that include No. of Soldier Deaths, Log (GDP per 
capita) and Log (Population). No. of Soldier Deaths is the average number of soldier deaths in a year. 
Log (GDP per capita) and Log (Population) are the natural logarithms of the GDP per capita and the 
population in a country, respectively. 𝛿𝑐 and 𝛶𝑡 are country and year fixed effects. We cluster our 
standard errors at the country level.   
We assess the relationship between the presence of military directors on the corporate 
board and firm performance using the following regression specification:  
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑐.𝑡 + 𝛷𝛧
′
𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛶𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡    (2) 
where the dependent variable 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is either the Tobin’s Q or ROA of firm i 
in industry j, country c, and year t. Our key variable of interest, 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑐.𝑡 is either Military 
Director Ratio, a measure calculated as the number of military directors on the board over the board 
size, or Military Director Dummy, an indicator that equals one if a firm has at least one military 
director sitting on its board and zero otherwise. 𝛧′𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is a vector of firm-level control variables, 
namely Market Capitalization, Leverage, PPE, Sales Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, Gender, 
Average Time on Board, and CEO Duality. Market Capitalization is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of a firm. Leverage is the ratio of a firm’s total liabilities to total assets. PPE is calculated as 
the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Sales Growth is the three-year average 
growth rate of the net sales. Board Size is the total number of directors on the board. Board 
Independence is measured as the number of non-executive directors divided by the board size. Gender 
is the number of male directors divided by the board size. Average Time on Board measures the 
average tenure of the board directors of a firm. CEO Duality is an indicator that equals one if a 
firm’s CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 𝛾𝑗 , 𝛿𝑐 , and 𝛶𝑡  are industry, 
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country and year fixed effects, respectively. In all regressions, we cluster our standard errors at the 
country level.  
4. War and country-level outcomes  
4.1 Economic growth, financial development and legal institutions  
In this section, we start by discussing the results of our motivating regressions. Wars damage 
human and physical capital (Collier et al. 2003). A large literature shows that war-torn regions 
experience a substantial decline in total output, experience slower economic development, and 
have less persistent growth rates compared to similar but peaceful regions (Barro 1991, Alesina et 
al. 1996, Alesina and Perotti 1996). In Table 2, we present the results on the relationship between 
war and country-level economic growth, while controlling for the level of economic development, 
population density, and country and year fixed effects. We find that war is significantly, negatively 
associated with economic growth as measured by the GDP per capita growth rate, and this 
relationship holds both at the intensive (War Involve (Number)) and extensive margin (War Involve 
(Dummy)). The economic magnitude of the estimates is large. For example, consider the estimate 
from column (3) in Table 2, where we include both country and year fixed effects to control for 
the various time-invariant confounders and year-specific shocks. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in War Involve (Number) (0.41) is associated with a 0.49 (=1.21*0.41) increase in GDP Per 
Capita Growth, which accounts for 20% of the sample mean (2.38). Similarly, on the extensive 
margin, consider the estimate from column (6) in Table 2. The coefficient implies that countries 
that have experienced war have a lower growth rate than otherwise similar countries that have not 
by 1.86 points, equivalent to 78% of the sample mean. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We find similar results on financial development and legal institutions. In particular, Table 
3 shows that wars, either measured by War Involve (Number) or War Involve (Dummy), are significantly, 
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negatively associated with financial development (Private Credit to GDP). The economic magnitude 
is non-trivial. Consider, for example, column (3) in Table 3. The estimate implies that a standard 
deviation increase in War Involve (Number) is associated with a 1.46 (=0.41*3.59) percentage point 
decrease in Private Credit to GDP, which equals 4.5% of the sample mean (32.76). As emphasized 
by King and Levine (1993), Levine (2005) and Popov (2018), financial development is crucial for 
promoting economic growth. Therefore, the negative relationship between wars and financial 
development warrants further research on the mechanism linking the two, i.e., military directors. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We present results on the relationship between wars and the quality of legal institutions in 
Table 4. In a series of influential studies, La Porta et al. (1998) show that a country’s legal 
environment is important in determining its economic outcomes. Better creditor rights protection, 
contract enforcement and private property protection, for example, are found to promote a 
country’s economic and financial development. We find that wars are negatively, significantly 
related to the quality of the legal system as measured by Rule of Law, an indicator that ranges from 
0 to 6, with higher values indicating better legal environments. The economic magnitude is large. 
For example, take the coefficients from column (3) in Table 4. The estimate suggests that a one-
standard-deviation increase in War Involve (Number) is related to a 0.16 (=0.405*0.3925) decrease in 
the Rule of Law index. This decrease is equal to 4.5% of the sample mean (3.58). The estimate from 
the extensive margin of war implies a similar change in the Rule of Law index.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2 War and military directors 
The results from Tables 2-4 reveal that wars are associated with worse economic growth and 
financial development and poorer legal environments, and the economic magnitudes are large. 
Therefore, it is important to study the underlying mechanisms that link the two, for example, via 
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the lens of military directors. Before discussing the main results for the effect of military directors 
on firm growth, however, it is critical to empirically demonstrate that wars are indeed related to a 
higher prevalence of military directors sitting on corporate boards. From Table 1, we can see that 
the number of firms with at least one military director on their board (MiliFirm) has substantial 
variation across countries. The standard deviation of MiliFirm is 102, which is about five times the 
sample mean (20.90). We observe a similar distribution in the number of military directors. In 
Figure 2, we also present a visualization of the distribution of firms with military directors across 
countries.   
In Table 5, we present the results of regressing either the total number of military directors 
in a country (MilDirNum) or the total number of firms with at least one military director sitting on 
their board (MiliFirm) on various measures of war intensity. We find that wars are indeed 
significantly, positively associated with both variables for military directors, and the economic size 
is large. Consider column (1) in Table 5, for example. The estimate implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the total number of years for which a country is at war (Total War (Year)) 
(6.19) is associated with an increase in the number of military directors of 167.63 (=6.19*27.08), 
which is six times higher than the sample mean (23.86). For another example, consider column (4) 
in Table 5. The coefficient on Total War (Number), a variable that equals the total number of wars 
that a country has experienced, suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase (4.60) is associated 
with an increase in the number of firms with at least one military director, of 155.25 (=33.75*4.60), 
which is also about six times higher than the sample mean (20.92). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5. Military directors and firm performance  
5.1 Baseline results 
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We next present our baseline results on the relationship between military directors and firm 
performance, in Table 6. From our OLS estimations, we find that military directors are negatively, 
significantly associated with firm performance as measured by either Tobin’s Q or ROA. The 
economic magnitude is large. For example, on the intensive margin, consider column (1) in Table 
6. The estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the Military Director Ratio (0.046), 
a variable that equals the ratio of military directors to board size, is associated with a 0.02 
(=0.046*0.412) decrease in a firm’s Tobin’s Q. This is equivalent to a 1% change when evaluated 
at the sample mean. On the extensive margin, consider column (4) in Table 6. The coefficient on 
Military Director Dummy, an indicator that equals one if a firm has at least one military director on 
its board, implies that firms with military directors are associated with a 0.005 drop in ROA 
compared to firms that are otherwise similar but have no military directors. The magnitude of the 
decrease is economically substantial since it amounts to 56% of the sample mean.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
These empirical regularities suggest that the negative impacts of military directors on firm 
performance outweigh the positive ones in our sample. As emphasized by Griliches and Mason 
(1972), experience in the armed forces is a poor substitute for the lost experience in the labour 
market. Angrist (1990, 1998) and Angrist and Krueger (1994) further substantiate this argument 
by showing that veterans have lower earnings than their otherwise similar non-veteran 
counterparts.  
Military directors who lack business experience, compared to their peers, can in turn 
produce poorer firm performance through the advisory mechanism. Indeed, a large literature 
documents that the business experience and knowledge of board directors play a critical role in 
firm growth (Francis, Hasan and Wu 2015, Güner, Malmendier and Tate 2008). Giannetti, Liao 
and Yu (2015), for instance, show that directors with experience of better management practices 
and corporate governance produce a substantial increase in firm performance. While our empirical 
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results do not rule out the positive effects of military directors on firm performance, the negative 
impacts, which are consistent with the literature discussed above, seem to dominate in our sample.    
5.2 Addressing potential reverse causality 
It is important to note that our results may be subject to reverse causality. That is, firms with 
poorer performance may be more likely to appoint military directors in order to improve 
performance. Indeed, an extensive literature documents that directors with military experience 
serve as better monitors of firms’ management teams and therefore enhance firm performance 
(e.g., Benmelech and Frydman 2015).  
To address this concern, we firstly re-run our baseline analyses using an LFD model, in 
which we regress the changes in the measures of firm performance in year t on the changes in the 
military director variables in year t-1. Like in model (2) in section 3.2, we include Market 
Capitalization, Leverage, PPE, Sales Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, Gender, Average Time on Board, 
and CEO Duality as our control variables. However, instead of the levels of these confounders, we 
use the changes in them in the year t-1.   
Results from the LFD model are presented in Table 7. We find that our results on Tobin’s 
Q become stronger both quantitatively and qualitatively. The results on ROA, however, become 
imprecisely estimated. One possible reason is that, due to a lack of business experience, military 
directors may put more emphasis on a firm’s short-term profit at the expense of its long-term 
growth potential. Therefore, we observe little difference in ROA between firms with more versus 
fewer military directors, but a large difference in Tobin’s Q, a measure of a firm’s growth potential. 
Another possible explanation is the reduced sample size. Using the LFD model, our sample size 
decreases by about 40%, which results in a larger standard error. Note that it is difficult to 
disentangle which explanation drives our results, or indeed whether it is both. Thus, we seek 
further evidence from a two-step dynamic GMM model. 
26 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
We re-run our analyses using a two-step dynamic panel system GMM model, which 
potentially allows us to circumvent both omitted variables and reverse causality issues (Blundell 
and Bond 1998, Judson and Owen 1999). In particular, we treat all dependent variables as 
endogenous, and instrument them using their lagged values in years t-3 and t-4, under the 
assumption that these lagged values influence the outcomes variables in year t only through their 
values in year t-1 (Bun and Windmeijer 2010).  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The estimates from the GMM model confirm our main results. We find that military 
directors significantly reduce firm performance as measured by either Tobin’s Q or ROA. The 
economic magnitudes are qualitatively similar to those in our baseline results. For example, 
consider column (1) in Table 8. The coefficient on Military Director Ratio suggests that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the ratio of military directors to board size (0.046) is associated with 
a decrease in a firm’s Tobin’s Q of 0.033 (=0.710*0.046), which is a 1.7% decrease evaluated at 
the sample mean. The effects on ROA are also economically substantial. Take the coefficient in 
column (4) of Table 8. This estimate implies that, if a firm starts to hire military directors, then its 
ROA will suffer from a loss of 0.013 points, which is about 1.4 times the sample mean (0.009).  
In sum, the evidence from our OLS, LFD and GMM models taken together suggests that 
military directors are negatively associated with firm performance, measured by either the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q or its ROA. While the evidence on Tobin’s Q is consistently robust across different 
model specifications that control for reverse causality and omitted variable issues, the results on 
firm ROA are sometimes imprecisely estimated. We present two possible reasons above and find 
support for the reduction in sample size explanation from the GMM estimations. Nonetheless, we 
suggest readers apply caution when interpreting our results.  
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5.3 Results from propensity score matching 
We also employ PSM to further test the relationship between military directors and firm 
performance, under the concern that the covariates included in the model may influence our results 
in a non-linear way. PSM allows us to estimate the treatment effects without assuming linear 
relationships between the covariates and the outcome variables.  
In particular, a firm with military directors is matched to a firm without them, based on 
the propensity score from the fitted value of the following probit regression model: 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑐.𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛷𝛧′𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛹𝑀′𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛶𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡           (3) 
where the dependent variable 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗,𝑐.𝑡 is an indicator that equals one if a firm has at least 
one military director sitting on its board and zero otherwise. 𝛧′𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is the same vector of firm-
level control variables as used in model (2), including Market Capitalization, Leverage, PPE, Sales 
Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, Gender, Average Time on Board, and CEO Duality. Industry, 
country and year fixed effects are also included. A new sample of firms with military directors and 
the matched firms without military directors is constructed based on the one-to-one nearest-
neighbour matching method. In sum, this new sample consists of 27,176 firm-year observations 
for Tobin’s Q and 26,610 for ROA. 
In Panel A of Table 9, we present our results from the probit model. The estimates suggest 
that firms of a bigger size and with a larger amount of debt are more likely to have a military 
director, as are firms with a larger board size, a higher level of board independence and more male 
directors4. Panel B of Table 9 shows the estimated treatment effects in our matched sample. We 
find that firms with military directors in general have worse performance as measured by either 
Tobin’s Q or ROA. Also, the estimate effects are quantitatively similar to our baseline results. 
 
4 Although we tabulate the PSM results in Panel A of Table 9 using firm observable characteristics in year t, our 
estimation remains consistent when using firm characteristics in year t-1. We thank one of the referees for this 
valuable point.  
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[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.4 Linking wars to firm performance 
Although we have linked war to an increase in the supply of military directors, and military 
directors to firm performance, we have not yet provided evidence on the direct impact of war on 
firm performance5. In this sub-section, we attempt to establish this relationship.  
To do so, we first use the total number of wars that a country has experienced to predict 
the military director ratio and the probability of having a military director on a firm’s board, 
respectively, conditional on a wide range of country- and firm-level characteristics. We then use 
these predicted measures as our main explanatory variables in model (2). As such, we attempt to 
isolate the variation in the military director measures that is determined by the total number of 
wars experienced by a country, and then link this source of variation to firm performance measures. 
Doing so allows us to test, at least partly, the direct impact of war on firm performance. This 
approach is widely used in the literature (e.g., Liang and Renneboog 2017[not in reference list]) 
and is similar to an instrumental variable (IV) approach except that the war variable is not treated 
as the instrument, as it is possible that war may operate on firm performance through channels 
other than the board directors.   
In particular, to construct the predicted measures of military directors, we run the 
following specification: 
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑐.𝑡 + 𝛷𝛧
′
𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛤𝑋′𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛶𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡    (4) 
 
where the dependent variable 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is either Military Director Ratio, a measure 
calculated as the number of military directors on the board over the board size, or Military Director 
Dummy, an indicator that equals one if a firm has at least one military director sitting on its board 
 
5 We thank one of the referees for this valuable comment.  
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and zero otherwise. 𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑐.𝑡  is measured as the accumulated number of wars experienced by 
country c at year t. 𝛧′𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is a vector of firm-level control variables, including Market Capitalization, 
Leverage, PPE, Sales Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, Gender, Average Time on Board, and CEO 
Duality. 𝑋′
𝑐,𝑡
 is a vector of country-level control variables that include Army Size, Log(GDP per 
capita) and Log(Population). 𝛾𝑗 and 𝛶𝑡 are industry and year fixed effects. We cluster our standard 
errors at the country level.   
We then use the predicted measures of military directors in model (2), and re-run our tests. 
As shown in Table 10, the coefficients are qualitatively similar to our previous estimates. Although 
it is difficult to interpret the coefficients when using predicted measures of military directors, this 
test does suggest that wars have a direct impact on firm performance through military directors. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6. Robustness checks  
In this section, we perform two sets of robustness checks on our baseline results. First, we include 
various board director characteristics that are found to be important for firm performance in the 
literature. Then, we redo our main analyses on the relationship between military directors and firm 
performance, while controlling for military directors’ frontline experience in the armed forces.   
6.1 Controlling for other board director characteristics 
An extensive literature documents the relationships between various board director characteristics 
and firm performance. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that female directors exert 
more effort in monitoring executives, and Gul, Srinidhi and Ng (2011) document that firms with 
more female directors have increased firm transparency. These results suggest that the gender 
composition of the corporate board has economic implications for firm performance. We 
therefore include a variable that measures the board’s gender composition in our model. Güner, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that board directors with commercial bank experience result in 
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an increase in firm access to external financing, and directors with investment bank experience are 
associated with a larger amount of debt issuance. Therefore, it is important to also include an 
indicator of directors’ financial experience. Several studies also find that directors with foreign 
experience can add value to firm performance. For example, Giannetti, Liao and Yu (2015) show 
that such directors can increase a firm’s governance quality and thus promote firm growth. Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2012) document that firms with foreign independent directors make better cross-
border acquisitions when the targets are from their home countries. We thus include an indicator 
of board directors’ foreign experience. Lastly, we include an indicator of board directors’ legal 
experience in our models, since several influential studies suggest that legal experience can add 
value to firms, particularly via cross-border acquisitions (e.g., Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012). 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
The results are presented in Table 11. We find that our estimates remain qualitatively 
unchanged, even after controlling for Gender, Foreign Background, Financial Expertise and Legal 
Experience. For example, consider the estimate in column (1), Table 11. The coefficient on Military 
Director Ratio implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the ratio of military directors to 
board size (0.046) is associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q of 0.017 (=0.046*0.375), 
approximately a 1% decrease compared to the sample mean.  
6.2 Controlling for frontline experience 
Next, we re-run our baseline regressions while controlling for military directors’ frontline 
experience in the armed forces. While all veterans receive similar basic training in the armed forces, 
they may have different experiences based on their roles in the army. Such heterogeneity in military 
experience may result in different implications for firm performance. BoardEx provides us with 
the roles the directors held when in the military, which allows us to distinguish frontline from 
other experiences. Specifically, we construct the variable Frontline as the proportion of military 
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directors that possess frontline experience, defined as holding a frontline role when in the armed 
forces6. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
We then include this variable in our main regression models specified in model (2). We 
present our results in Table 12. We find that our main results are unchanged even after controlling 
for frontline experience. That is, our measures of military directors are significantly, negatively 
associated with firm performance. The coefficients on the frontline measure are also insignificant, 
which suggests that, after taking military experience in general into account, frontline experience 
becomes unimportant.   
7. Military directors and firm leverage  
In this section, we present suggestive evidence on the relationship between military directors and 
firm leverage. While the results from previous sections taken together suggest a negative 
relationship between military directors and performance, and such evidence is consistent with 
existing theory in the literature (Angrist 1990, 1998, Angrist and Krueger 1994, Francis, Hasan and 
Wu 2015, Güner, Malmendier and Tate 2008), it is important to examine whether any firm policies 
reflect such a negative relationship. In particular, we ask whether firms with military directors have 
higher leverage, which could potentially increase the insolvency risk over the long run. Such 
evidence can help us understand the potential underlying mechanism linking military directors to 
negative firm performance.  
We first run an OLS model that is similar to the model (2) specification, but where we 
replace the firm performance measures with a measure of firm leverage. We control for a wide 
 
6 The relevant roles are Adjutant General, Admiral, Air Marshall, Air Vice Marshall, Brigadier General, Captain, Chief 
of Air Staff, Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of General Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Operations, Commandant, 
Commander, Commander-in-Chief, Commanding General, Commanding Officer, Commentator, Deputy 
Commander, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshall, First Lieutenant, First Sea Lord/Chief of Naval Staff, 
General, Lieutenant, Lieutenant Colonel, Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant General, Major, Major General, Military 
Assistant, Military Service, Naval Aviator, Second Lieutenant, Veterinarian, Vice Admiral, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, 
and Vice Commander. 
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range of firm-level variables found to be important in the literature, namely Market Capitalization, 
Leverage, PPE, Sales Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, Gender, Average Time on Board, and CEO 
Duality. For detailed variable definitions, see Appendix 1. We also include industry, country, and 
year fixed effects in all regressions and cluster our standard errors at the country level.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
Table 13 presents our results. We find that military directors are significantly, positively 
associated with firm leverage. The economic magnitude is large. Consider column (1) in Table 13, 
for example. The estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in Military Director Ratio 
(0.046) is associated with an increase in firm leverage of 0.003 (=0.046*0.058), a 0.6% increase 
evaluated at the sample mean. To address the potential reverse causality issue, we use an LFD 
model in which we regress the change in leverage for a firm in year t on the changes in all 
independent variables in year t-1. We find that our results are qualitatively the same, as shown in 
Table 14.  
[Insert Table 14 here] 
In Table 15, we perform a simple test to alleviate the possible reverse causality concern. 
That is, firms with higher leverage may tend to employ more military directors. We regress the 
change in military directors in a firm on the change in leverage, while controlling for other firm 
characteristics. The results show that the coefficient on the change in leverage is not statistically 
meaningful, and therefore do not support the reverse causality claim.  
[Insert Table 15 here] 
8. Conclusion and future research 
Understanding the link between war and its consequences is important, since nearly half of all 
countries in the world have experienced some form of war in the past few decades (Gleditsch et 
al. 2002, Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, Blattman and Miguel 2010). In this study, we shed light 
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on this important topic by, firstly, documenting the negative relationships between wars and 
economic, financial, and legal development. We then discuss and present evidence on a new 
channel through which wars impact economic outcomes—military directors. While most of the 
previous studies on wars emphasize the damages of conflicts at the macro level (Collier et al. 2003, 
Barro 1991, Alesina et al. 1996, Alesina and Perotti 1996), we provide new evidence on how wars 
influence economic performance through a micro lens. We find that military directors damage 
firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also provide some evidence that 
military directors are associated with higher firm leverage, suggesting a potential channel through 
which military directors might influence firm performance.   
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to studies that focus on the 
economic legacies of war (Cerra and Saxena 2008, Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, Justino and 
Verwimp 2006). Unlike previous studies, we show that war hinders economic performance 
through the influence of military directors in war-affected areas. This implies that the influence of 
wars on the economy goes beyond the direct effects on physical and human capital. Second, we 
contribute to the literature on negative impacts of war on human capital (Alderman, Hoddinott 
and Kinsey 2006, Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009, Shemyakina 2006). Our study sheds 
light on this literature by documenting that, for those who have found their way into skilled 
employment, war experiences can still exert adverse impacts on their performance. Lastly, our 
study speaks to the literature on post-war economic recovery (Davis and Weinstein 2002, Brakman, 
Garretsen and Schramm 2004, Miguel and Roland 2006). Our paper shows that war can have 
lasting impacts through human capital. Even wars that happened nearly 200 years ago can still have 
a negative influence on the affected regions.  
We finally discuss several limitations of this study and provide some suggestions for future research. 
Firstly, there may be other firm policies that are not examined in this study but are affected by the 
presence of military directors on boards. To provide convincing evidence on the mechanisms that 
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link military directors to firm performance, it will be necessary to collect more consistent 
information on firm policies in a global sample. In addition, if data on detailed board voting 
decisions existed for a global sample over a period of time, one could even disentangle the advisory 
and monitoring channels through which military directors might exert impacts on firm 
performance. Another potential fruitful area of research is policy interventions regarding veterans 
serving on corporate boards. It would be interesting to see how government policies that limited 
veterans’ corporate board directorships might affect firm performance. However, such policies 
would be difficult to design and implement, since there may be heterogeneity in the relationship 
between military directors and firm growth. Such heterogeneity is itself another research area that 
warrants further study. Lastly, conditional on the results of the current study, an important research 
topic would be to further investigate the boundary conditions that might affect the direction of 
the relationship between military directors and firm performance. One such potential candidate 
boundary condition is the cost of obtaining inside information. As implied by Adams and Ferreira 
(2007), Harris and Raviv (2006), and Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010), the positive effect on 
firm performance of heightened monitoring is more pronounced when the cost of obtaining 
relevant firm information is low. Since there is a lot of heterogeneity across firms in terms of their 
information environment, military directors may have a net positive impact on transparent firms.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Observation Mean SD Min  Max  
Macro Level      
War Involve (Number) 5600 0.138 0.405 0.000 4.000 
War Involve (Dummy) 5600 0.120 0.325 0.000 1.000 
No. of Soldier Deaths 5600 33.297 314.349 0.000 4780.603 
Private Credit to GDP 2306 32.756 32.222 0.938 212.249 
GDP Per Capita Growth %   2691 2.383 6.886 -64.996 92.123 
Rule of Law 1506 3.579 1.452 0.000 6.000 
Log(GDP per capita) 2744 7.145 1.594 3.625 10.950 
Log(Population) 3453 16.394 1.456 11.524 21.004 
Total War (Number) 501 2.864 4.599 0.000 22.000 
Total War (Year) 501 2.966 6.190 0.000 35.000 
Total Soldier Deaths 501 1381.140 8944.416 0.000 66928.445 
MiliFirm 501 20.918 102.008 0.000 912.000 
MilDirNum 501 23.858 116.135 0.000 1028.000 
Governance Level      
Military Director Ratio 128260 0.016 0.046 0.000 0.714 
Military Director Dummy 128260 0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000 
Board Size 128260 9.135 3.858 3.000 22.000 
Board Independence 128260 0.705 0.175 0.200 1.000 
Gender 128239 0.913 0.105 0.571 1.000 
Average Time on Board 128260 6.194 3.902 0.300 19.250 
CEO Duality 128260 0.312 0.463 0.000 1.000 
Legal Expertise 128260 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Foreign Experience 128260 0.286 0.452 0.000 1.000 
Financial Expertise 128260 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000 
Firm Level      
Tobin’s Q 91468 1.966 1.642 0.436 11.157 
ROA 91468 0.009 0.242 -1.407 0.387 
Market Capitalization 91468 20.042 2.182 14.773 25.094 
Leverage 91468 0.504 0.261 0.008 1.452 
PPE 91468 0.524 0.418 0.003 1.932 
Sales Growth 91468 14.984 37.247 -74.164 228.532 
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Table 2: War and GDP Per Capita Growth 
This table presents the results of regressing GDP per capita growth on proxies of wars. The dependent variable is GDP Per Capita Growth % 
for each country in each year. Our key variables of interest are two indicators for war. War Involve (Number) is the total number of wars in a 
country in each year. War Involve (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a war in a country in a given year. No. of Soldier Deaths 
is the average number of deaths per war for a country in a given year. Log (GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita. Log 
(Population) is the natural logarithm of the total population in each country. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and t-
statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
War Involve 
(Number) 
-1.3937** -1.5095*** -1.2108**    
 (-2.56) (-2.93) (-2.25)    
War Involve (Dummy)    -2.1721*** -2.2812*** -1.8596*** 
    (-3.43) (-3.91) (-2.98) 
No. of Soldier Deaths -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0008* -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0005 
 (-1.40) (0.77) (-1.83) (-0.83) (1.20) (-1.32) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.1391 -1.0089  -0.1596 -1.0484 
  (-1.05) (-0.96)  (-1.19) (-1.00) 
Log(Population)  0.3257 -4.8786*  0.3308* -4.9958* 
  (1.64) (-1.73)  (1.70) (-1.77) 
Constant 2.6425*** -1.7196 81.5555* 2.7212*** -1.5805 83.5289* 
 (10.79) (-0.49) (1.71) (11.13) (-0.45) (1.75) 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
No. of Countries 71 70 70 71 70 70 
R2 0.010 0.013 0.159 0.014 0.017 0.162 





Table 3: War and Private Credit to GDP 
This table presents the results of regressing the ratio of private credit to GDP on proxies of wars. The dependent variable is Private Credit to GDP for 
each country in each year. Our key variables of interest are two indicators for war. War Involve (Number) is the total number of wars in a country in a 
given year. War Involve (Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a war in a country in a given year. No. of Soldier Deaths is the average 
number of deaths per war for a country in a given year. Log (GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita. Log (Population) is the 
natural logarithm of the total population in each country. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, 
** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
War Involve (Number) -4.4398 -2.5872 -3.5931**    
 (-1.04) (-1.11) (-2.32)    
War Involve (Dummy)    -8.9473*** -5.2491** -4.8662** 
    (-2.66) (-2.09) (-2.44) 
No. of Soldier Deaths -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0016 0.0008 0.0025 
 (-0.07) (-0.11) (0.75) (0.32) (0.28) (0.94) 
Log(GDP per capita)  12.3582*** 10.0858***  12.2773*** 9.9672*** 
  (7.42) (3.48)  (7.47) (3.44) 
Log(Population)  6.6631*** -34.5367*  6.7260*** -35.0825* 
  (3.31) (-1.72)  (3.35) (-1.75) 
Constant 33.5384*** -164.9606*** 507.9705 34.0993*** -165.0988*** 517.1748 
 (10.31) (-4.56) (1.57) (9.94) (-4.59) (1.60) 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
No. of Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 
R2 0.004 0.450 0.809 0.010 0.451 0.809 




Table 4: War and Rule of Law 
This table presents the results of regressing the rule of law index on proxies of wars. The dependent variable is Rule of Law from the ICRG database. 
Our key variables of interest are two indicators for war. War Involve (Number) is the total number of wars in a country in a given year. War Involve 
(Dummy) is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a war in a country in a given year. No. of Soldier Deaths is the average number of deaths per war 
for a country in a given year. Log (GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita. Log (Population) is the natural logarithm of the total 
population in each country. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Rule of Law Rule of Law Rule of Law Rule of Law Rule of Law Rule of Law 
War Involve (Number) -1.2719*** -0.9847*** -0.3925**    
 (-4.54) (-3.58) (-2.57)    
War Involve (Dummy)    -1.3460*** -1.0586*** -0.4140** 
    (-4.81) (-3.77) (-2.54) 
Number of Soldier Deaths -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (-0.79) (-1.02) (0.58) (-0.64) (-0.89) (0.66) 
Log(GDP per capita)  0.5098*** 0.3628*  0.5093*** 0.3644* 
  (6.60) (1.86)  (6.59) (1.88) 
Log(Population)  0.2288*** 1.5709*  0.2292*** 1.5803* 
  (4.66) (1.99)  (4.67) (1.99) 
Constant 3.7420*** -4.0927*** -26.2460* 3.7467*** -4.0908*** -26.4039* 
 (25.93) (-3.89) (-1.96) (25.93) (-3.90) (-1.97) 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
No. of Countries 63 61 61 63 61 61 
R2 0.094 0.361 0.801 0.097 0.365 0.801 





Table 5: War and Military Directors 
This table presents the results of regressing the supply of military directors on proxies of wars. The dependent variable is either MilDirNum, the total 
number of military directors in a country, or MiliFirm, the total number of firms that have at least one military director. Our key variables of interest 
are three indicators for war. Total War (Number) is the total number of wars in a country before a given year. Total War (Year) is the total number of 
years that a country is at war before a given year. Total Soldier Death is the total number of casualties for a country before a given year. Log (GDP per 
capita) is the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita. Log (Population) is the natural logarithm of the total population in each country. Log (Market 
Capitalization) is the natural logarithm of the total value of the stock market of a country in a given year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
country level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MilDirNum MilDirNum MilDirNum MiliFirm MiliFirm MiliFirm 






























Log(GDP per capita) -41.042 -54.866 -41.931 -36.224 -49.867 -38.200 
 (-1.485) (-1.349) (-1.284) (-1.374) (-1.262) (-1.193) 
Log(Population) 27.475 -40.914 -19.535 22.067 -40.342 -21.224 
 (0.570) (-1.174) (-0.868) (0.531) (-1.192) (-1.083) 
Log(Market Capitalization) 0.818 -1.861 -0.252 0.568 -1.855 -0.414 
 (0.531) (-1.070) (-0.278) (0.397) (-1.126) (-0.475) 
Constant -296.145 1120.847 677.766 -225.672 1077.706 680.852 
 (-0.352) (1.384) (1.278) (-0.314) (1.389) (1.388) 
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 
R2 0.906 0.942 0.974 0.900 0.936 0.970 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 
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Table 6 Military Directors and Firm Performance 
This table presents the results of regressing firm performance measures on military directors. 
The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q in columns (1) and (2) or ROA in columns (3) and 
(4). Our key variables of interest are two measures of military directors. Military Director Ratio is 
the ratio of military directors to the total number of directors on a board. Military Director Dummy 
is an indicator that equals one if a firm has a military director and zero otherwise. Market 
Capitalization is the natural logarithm of the value of the stock market. Leverage is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. PPE is the ratio of the value of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets. Sales Growth is the three-year average growth rate of the net sales. Board Size is the total 
number of board directors in year t. Board Independence is the ratio of non-executive directors to 
the total number of directors in year t. Gender is the ratio of the number of male directors to the 
total number of directors. Average Time on Board is the average tenure of all the directors on the 
board. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and t-statistics are in brackets. 
***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Military Director Ratio -0.4119**  -0.0200  
 (-2.15)  (-1.29)  
Military Director Dummy  -0.0617***  -0.0052** 
  (-2.84)  (-2.57) 
Market Capitalization 0.2342*** 0.2343*** 0.0494*** 0.0494*** 
 (9.76) (9.78) (18.35) (18.34) 
Leverage 0.2397* 0.2402* -0.1314*** -0.1313*** 
 (1.89) (1.90) (-18.45) (-18.46) 
PPE -0.3783*** -0.3786*** 0.0205** 0.0204** 
 (-5.57) (-5.58) (2.46) (2.45) 
Sales Growth 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (3.04) (3.04) (3.48) (3.48) 
Board Size -0.1189*** -0.1181*** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** 
 (-6.65) (-6.69) (-5.70) (-5.63) 
Board Independence -0.7044*** -0.7044*** -0.0426*** -0.0424*** 
 (-5.00) (-5.01) (-3.38) (-3.38) 
Gender  0.1837* 0.1822* -0.0564*** -0.0565*** 
 (1.86) (1.84) (-4.57) (-4.58) 
Average Time on Board -0.0195*** -0.0195*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 
 (-7.96) (-7.93) (11.58) (11.56) 
CEO Duality -0.0504 -0.0502 0.0073 0.0073 
 (-0.83) (-0.83) (1.03) (1.03) 
Constant 0.8526*** 0.8422*** -0.8413*** -0.8427*** 
 (3.41) (3.34) (-10.34) (-10.33) 
Industry, Country, and 
Year Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.181 0.181 0.260 0.260 




Table 7: Military Directors and Firm Performance, Lagged Difference 
Model 
This table shows the results for military directors against firm performance, obtained from a 
lagged difference model. The dependent variables are the differenced values of Tobin’s Q in 
columns (1) and (2) and ROA in columns (3) and (4). Our key variable of interest is either 
∆Military Director Ratio, the change in the ratio of military directors to board size in year t-1, or 
∆Military Director Dummy, the change in the military dummy variable in year t-1. Control variables 
are the same as in Table 6, but, instead of the levels, we are using the changes in year t-1. For 
detailed variable definitions, see Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country 
level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
 ∆Tobin's Q  ∆ROA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 


















∆Market Capitalization -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (-11.854) (-11.890) (-8.694) (-8.698) 
∆Leverage -0.102** -0.102** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (-2.112) (-2.088) (2.131) (2.133) 
∆PPE 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.016 0.016 
 (6.792) (6.779) (1.347) (1.347) 
∆Sales Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.961) (-0.956) (-0.954) (-0.954) 
∆Board Size -0.009*** -0.009** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-2.906) (-2.628) (-0.223) (-0.239) 
∆Board Independence 0.007 0.003 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.159) (0.068) (-0.859) (-0.861) 
∆Gender 0.116 0.115 0.018 0.018 
 (1.560) (1.539) (1.417) (1.396) 
∆Average Time on 
Board 
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.808) (-2.800) (-1.419) (-1.435) 
∆CEO Duality 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 
 (0.838) (0.824) (0.789) (0.785) 
Constant -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.970) (-2.950) (-4.224) (-4.205) 
R2 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.008 









Table 8: Military Directors and Firm Performance, GMM Model 
This table presents the results of two-step dynamic GMM estimations of military directors on 
firm performance, allowing for two lags of the dependent variables. All independent variables 
are instrumented by their lagged values in years t-3 and t-4, assuming they influence the outcome 
variables only through their values at year t-1. The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q in 
columns (1) and (2) or ROA in columns (3) and (4). Our key variable of interest is either Military 
Director Ratio, the ratio of military directors to board size, or Military Director Dummy, an indicator 
that equals one if a firm has at least one military director on its board and zero otherwise. Control 
variables include Market Capitalization, Leverage, PPE, Sales Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, 
Gender, Average Time on Board, and CEO Duality. For detailed variable definitions, see Appendix 
1. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. T-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors and presented in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively.  
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 


















Market Capitalization -0.049*** -0.048*** 0.013** 0.013** 
  (-2.759) (-2.745) (2.219) (2.234) 
Leverage 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.004 0.004 
  (3.129) (3.139) (0.202) (0.200) 
PPE -0.030 -0.029 -0.010 -0.010 
  (-0.400) (-0.394) (-0.736) (-0.749) 
Sales Growth 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.434) (0.432) (-0.285) (-0.316) 
Board Size -0.014** -0.013** -0.004** -0.004** 
  (-2.132) (-1.999) (-2.549) (-2.425) 
Board Independence 0.151 0.157 0.010 0.011 
  (0.947) (0.982) (0.348) (0.390) 
Gender -0.072 -0.075 -0.005 -0.005 
  (-0.377) (-0.396) (-0.144) (-0.148) 
Average Time on Board -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.189) (-0.275) (-1.263) (-1.284) 
CEO Duality 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 
 (0.066) (0.008) (0.396) (0.393) 
L.Tobin’s Q 0.711*** 0.708*** - - 
 (9.285) (9.264) - - 
L2.Tobin’s Q -0.013 -0.011 - - 
 (-0.298) (-0.251) - - 
L.ROA - - 0.697*** 0.695*** 
 - - (9.447) (9.364) 
L2.ROA - - -0.059** -0.059** 
 - - (-2.377) (-2.343) 
Constant 1.313*** 1.303*** 0.000 0.000 
 (2.666) (2.655) (.) (.) 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.261 0.278 0.000 0.000 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9: Military Directors and Firm Performance by PSM 
This table presents the results of one-to-one propensity score matching of nearest neighbour, based 
on Market Capitalization, Leverage, PPE, Sales Growth, Board Size, Board Independence, Gender, Average 
Time on Board, and CEO Duality. The dependent variable in Panel A is Military Director Dummy, which 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one military director on its board. For 
detailed variable definitions, see Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country 
level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Boards with Military Directors 
 Military Director Dummy 






Sales Growth -0.0004 
 (-1.35) 
Board Size 0.1460*** 
 (35.80) 




Average Time on Board 0.0120*** 
 (4.14) 




Industry Fixed Effects YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES 
Pseudo R2 0.1167 
Observations 93292 
Panel B: Average Treatment Effects 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
Observations 13588 13305 
Mean of Treated 1.9475 0.0312 
Observations 13588 13305 
Mean of Matched Non-Treated 1.9996 0.0359 
Difference-in-Mean -0.0521*** -0.0047* 







Table 10: Military Directors and Performance, Controlling for Other Board 
Director Characteristics 
This table presents the estimated impacts of military directors on firm performance while 
controlling for other board director characteristics. The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q or 
ROA. Our key variable of interest is either Military Director Ratio, which is the ratio of military 
directors to board size, or Military Director Dummy, which is an indicator that equals one if a firm 
has at least one military director and zero otherwise. Other board director characteristics include 
Legal Expertise, an indicator that equals one if the proportion of directors with a legal background 
is above the industry median value and zero otherwise, Foreign Background, an indicator that equals 
one if the proportion of directors with foreign experience is above the industry median value and 
zero otherwise, and Financial Expertise, an indicator that equals one if the proportion of directors 
with financial experience is above the industry median value and zero otherwise. For detailed 
variable definitions, see Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and 
t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Tobin's Q  ROA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Military Director Ratio -0.375*   -0.014  
  (-1.958)   (-0.910)  
Military Director Dummy  -0.056**   -0.004* 
   (-2.580)   (-2.028) 
Market Capitalization 0.236*** 0.236***  0.051*** 0.051*** 
  (9.437) (9.452)  (19.634) (19.617) 
Leverage 0.245* 0.245*  -0.130*** -0.130*** 
  (1.939) (1.944)  (-18.332) (-18.343) 
PPE -0.378*** -0.378***  0.018** 0.018** 
  (-5.477) (-5.486)  (2.076) (2.073) 
Sales Growth 0.003*** 0.003***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (2.968) (2.968)  (3.434) (3.430) 
Board Size -0.118*** -0.117***  -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-6.484) (-6.514)  (-6.319) (-6.254) 
Board Independence -0.703*** -0.703***  -0.026** -0.026** 
  (-4.758) (-4.769)  (-2.306) (-2.299) 
Gender 0.179* 0.178*  -0.054*** -0.054*** 
  (1.913) (1.891)  (-4.458) (-4.473) 
Average Time on Board -0.019*** -0.019***  0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (-8.314) (-8.288)  (11.258) (11.232) 
CEO Duality -0.052 -0.052  0.007 0.007 
  (-0.860) (-0.858)  (1.073) (1.076) 
Legal Expertise -0.083*** -0.082***  0.001 0.001 
 (-3.901) (-3.882)  (0.385) (0.437) 
Foreign Background 0.049** 0.049**  -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (2.082) (2.085)  (-11.206) (-11.236) 
Financial Expertise -0.072*** -0.072***  -0.017** -0.017** 
 (-2.889) (-2.876)  (-2.329) (-2.311) 
Constant -0.245 -0.250  -0.986*** -0.986*** 
 (-0.938) (-0.954)  (-14.069) (-14.052) 
Industry, Country, and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.181 0.181  0.263 0.263 
Observations 92681 92681  90454 90454 
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Table 11: Military Directors and Performance, Controlling for Frontline 
Experience 
This table presents the estimated impacts of military directors on firm performance while 
controlling for frontline experience. No. of Frontline Directors is the number of military directors 
who possess frontline experience in Panel A, and Percentage of Frontline is the number of 
military directors that possess frontline experience over the total number of military directors, in 
Panel B. Frontline experience is identified using the name of the role played by the director when 
in the military. The dependent variable is either Tobin’s Q or ROA. Our key variable of interest is 
either Military Director Ratio, which is the ratio of military directors to board size, or Military 
Director Dummy, which is an indicator that equals one if a firm has at least one military director 
and zero otherwise. For detailed variable definitions, please refer to Appendix 1. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the country level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  Tobin's Q ROA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:         
Military Director Ratio  -0.364*  -0.018  
 (-1.756)  (-1.025)  
Military Director Dummy   -0.058**  -0.006*** 
 
 (-2.355)  (-2.832) 
No. of Frontline Directors -0.013 -0.007 -0.000 0.002 
 (-0.777) (-0.361) (-0.157) (0.920) 
Constant and Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Country, and Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.181 0.181 0.260 0.260 
Observations 93697 93697 91460 91460 
Panel B:     
Military Director Ratio  -0.457**  -0.014  
 (-2.315)  (-0.856)  
Military Director Dummy   -0.078***  -0.006** 
 
 (-3.184)  (-2.410) 
Percentage of Frontline  0.016 0.036 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.954) (1.551) (-0.729) (0.540) 
Constant and Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Country, and Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.181 0.181 0.260 0.260 











Table 12: Military Directors and Firm Policies 
This table presents the results of regressing firm Leverage on military directors. Leverage is the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Our key variable of interest is either Military Director Ratio, 
which is the ratio of military directors to board size, or Military Director Dummy, which is an 
indicator that equals one if a firm has at least one military director sitting on its board and zero 
otherwise. Market Capitalization is the natural logarithm of stock market capitalization. PPE is 
the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Sales Growth is three-year average 
growth rate of the net sales. Board Size is the total number of board directors on the board. Board 
Independence is the ratio of non-executive directors to board size in year t. Gender is the ratio of 
male directors to board size. Average Time on Board is the average tenure of all the directors on 
the board. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s CEO is also the chairman 
of the board. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and t-statistics are in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Leverage Leverage 
Military Director Ratio 0.0580**  
 (2.58)  
Military Director Dummy  0.0118*** 
  (2.89) 
Market Capitalization -0.0054** -0.0054** 
 (-2.38) (-2.41) 
PPE 0.1266*** 0.1266*** 
 (10.32) (10.32) 
Sales Growth -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-1.47) (-1.47) 
Board Size 0.0127*** 0.0125*** 
 (4.96) (4.83) 
Board Independence 0.0772*** 0.0770*** 
 (5.00) (4.96) 
Gender -0.0361* -0.0359* 
 (-1.74) (-1.73) 
Average Time on Board -0.0056*** -0.0056*** 
 (-5.59) (-5.57) 
CEO Duality 0.0182*** 0.0181*** 
 (6.96) (6.93) 
Constant 0.2621*** 0.2648*** 
 (8.08) (8.22) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster YES YES 
R2 0.187 0.188 





Table 13: Military Directors and Firm Policy, Lagged Difference Model 
This table shows the results for military directors against firm leverage, obtained from a lagged 
difference model. The dependent variable is the change in the value of Leverage in year t. Our key 
variable of interest is either ∆Military Director Ratio, the change in the ratio of the number of military 
directors to board size in year t-1, or ∆Military Director Dummy, the change in the military dummy 
variable in year t-1. Control variables are the same as in Table 6, but, instead of the levels, we are 
using the changes in year t-1. For detailed variable definitions, see Appendix 1. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the country level and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆Leverage ∆Leverage 
∆Military Director Ratio 0.109***  
 (5.956)  
∆Military Director Dummy  0.014*** 
  (6.798) 
∆Market Capitalization -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-8.619) (-8.609) 
∆PPE 0.129*** 0.129*** 
 (5.730) (5.730) 
∆Sales Growth -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.466) (-1.481) 
∆Board Size 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (5.544) (5.584) 
∆Board Independence 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (2.856) (2.891) 
∆Gender -0.078*** -0.078*** 
 (-3.544) (-3.524) 
∆Average Time on Board -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.289) (-1.297) 
∆CEO Duality 0.003 0.003 
 (1.263) (1.258) 
Constant -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-4.150) (-4.156) 
R2 0.041 0.041 













Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description Source 
Macro-Level Variables   
War Involve (Number) The number of wars in a country in a year. COW War 
War Involve (Dummy) A dummy variable equal to one if there is a war in a 
country in year. 
COW War 
No. of Soldier Deaths The average number of soldier deaths (in 
thousands) in wars in a country.  
COW War 
Total War (Number) The number of wars for a country in a given year COW War 
Total War (Year) The number of years for which a country is 
involved in war before a given year. 
COW War 
Total Soldier Deaths The number of soldier deaths for a country before 
a given year. 
COW War 
Log(GDP per capita) The natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
per capita. 
World Bank 
Log(Population) The natural logarithm of the total population of a 
country. 
World Bank 
GDP per Capita 
Growth % 
Gross domestic product per capita growth. World Bank 
Private Credit to GDP The total amount of credit channelled into the 
private sector scaled by a country’s GDP. 
World Bank 
Rule of Law Law and Order from the ICRG database. To assess 
the “Law” element, the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system are considered, while the “Order” 
element is an assessment of popular observance of 
the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating of 
3 in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating of 
1 if it suffers from a very high crime rate and the 
law is routinely ignored without effective sanction 
(for example, widespread illegal strikes). 
ICRG 
MilDirNum The total number of directors with military 
experience in a country in a given year. 
BoardEx 
MiliFirm The total number of firms that have at least one 
military director on their boards in a country in a 
given year. 
BoardEx 
   
Firm-Level Variables   
Market Capitalization The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm. WorldScope 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. WorldScope 
PPE The ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets. 
WorldScope 
Sales Growth Three-year average growth rate of net sales. WorldScope 
Tobin’s Q Sum of equity market capitalization and total 
liabilities divided by the sum of the book values of 
common equity and total liabilities. 
WorldScope 








Military Director Ratio Ratio of number of military directors to board size. BoardEx 
Military Director 
Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has at least 
one military director on its board, and zero 
otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Board Size Number of board directors on the board in a given 
year. 
BoardEx 
Board Independence The ratio of non-executive directors to board size 
in a given year. 
BoardEx 
Gender The ratio of the number of male directors to board 
size. 
BoardEx 
Average Time on 
Board 
The average tenure of the board directors of a firm 
in a given year. 
BoardEx 
CEO Duality An indicator that equals one if a firm’s CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Frontline The ratio of military directors possessing frontline 
soldier experience to board size. Frontline soldier 
experience is identified by the name of their role 
when employed in the military being one of the 
following: Adjutant General, Admiral, Air Marshall, 
Air Vice Marshall, Brigadier General, Captain, Chief 
of Air Staff, Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of 
General Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of 
Operations, Commandant, Commander, 
Commander-in-Chief, Commanding General, 
Commanding Officer, Commentator, Deputy 
Commander, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Field 
Marshall, First Lieutenant, First Sea Lord/Chief of 
Naval Staff, General, Lieutenant, Lieutenant 
Colonel, Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant 
General, Major, Major General, Military Assistant, 
Military Service, Naval Aviator, Second Lieutenant, 
Veterinarian, Vice Admiral, Vice Chief of Defence 
Staff, and Vice Commander. 
BoardEx 
Foreign Background An indicator that equals one if the ratio of directors 
with foreign backgrounds is above the industry 
median value and zero otherwise. Foreign 
background is identified by the nationality of a 
director being different from the country in which 
he/she is working.  
BoardEx 
Financial Expertise An indicator that equals one if the ratio of directors 
with financial experience is above the industry 
median value and zero otherwise. Financial 
experience is defined as previous experience of 
working in the financial industry.  
BoardEx 
Legal Expertise An indicator that equals one if the ratio of directors 
with legal backgrounds is above the industry 
median value and zero otherwise. Legal experience 





Appendix 2: Summary Statistics by Country  
Country Firm War Country Firm War Country Firm War Country Firm War 
Afghanistan N/A 7 Denmark 31 N/A Jersey 42 N/A Puerto Rico 1 N/A 
Algeria N/A 4 Dominican Republic N/A 1 Jordan 1 4 Qatar 3 N/A 
Angola N/A 8 Ecuador N/A 1 Kazakhstan 1 N/A Romania 1 2 
Argentina 12 3 Egypt 7 7 Kenya 3 N/A Russia 66 11 
Armenia N/A 2 El Salvador N/A 2 Kuwait 1 1 Rwanda N/A 6 
Australia 876 8 Eritrea N/A 2 Lebanon N/A 6 Saudi Arabia 15 2 
Austria 47 N/A Ethiopia N/A 13 Libya N/A 3 Sierra Leone 1 N/A 
Azerbaijan 1 2 Falkland Islands 1 N/A Luxembourg 56 N/A Singapore 287 N/A 
Bahamas 2 N/A Faroe Islands 2 N/A Macau 7 N/A Slovenia 1 N/A 
Bangladesh 1 N/A Finland 51 N/A Madagascar 1 N/A Somalia N/A 7 
Barbados 1 N/A France 498 21 Malaysia 181 N/A South Africa 225 5 
Belgium 86 N/A Gabon 1 N/A Malta 4 N/A South Korea 65 3 
Bermuda 62 N/A Georgia 1 2 Mauritius 2 N/A Spain 131 2 
Bosnia N/A 2 Germany 361 N/A Mexico 50 N/A Sri Lanka N/A 4 
Brazil 74 N/A Gibraltar 4 N/A Monaco 10 N/A Sweden 124 N/A 
Burundi N/A 4 Greece 50 3 Mongolia 2 1 Switzerland 122 N/A 
Cambodia 1 7 Guatemala N/A 3 Morocco 2 4 Syria N/A 10 
Canada 946 5 Guernsey 39 N/A Namibia 1 N/A Taiwan 59 N/A 
Cayman Islands 15 N/A Honduras N/A 1 Nepal N/A 2 Tanzania 1 3 
Chad N/A 7 Hong Kong 485 N/A Netherlands 172 5 Thailand 26 5 
Channel Islands 1 N/A Hungary 11 2 New Zealand 57 N/A Turkey 28 7 
Chile 29 1 Iceland 6 N/A Nicaragua N/A 2 Uganda N/A 6 
China 547 13 India 456 10 Nigeria 19 N/A Ukraine 4 N/A 
Colombia 12 3 Indonesia 37 12 Norway 116 N/A United Arab Emirates 25 2 
Congo N/A 9 Iran N/A 6 Oman 1 2 United Kingdom 2309 16 
Costa Rica N/A 1 Iraq N/A 17 Pakistan 2 8 United States 5821 22 
Cote D'Ivoire 1 N/A Ireland 114 N/A Panama 1 N/A Vietnam 4 12 
Croatia 2 4 Isle of Man 30 N/A Papua New Guinea 6 N/A Virgin Islands (Brit) 12 N/A 
Cuba N/A 7 Israel 144 8 Peru 6 2 Yemen N/A 6 
Curacao 2 N/A Italy 110 N/A Philippines 34 8 Zambia 2 N/A 
Cyprus 20 1 Jamaica 1 N/A Poland 29 3 Zimbabwe 1 3 
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Czech Republic 2 N/A Japan 446 N/A Portugal 30 N/A    
 
